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Russia’s Young Army
Raising New Generations into Militarized Patriots
Jonna Alava
Abstract
This chapter addresses military-patriotic education in Russia. The 
Russian state pays increasing attention to the military-patriotic 
upbringing of children and youth, hoping to achieve a larger draft 
pool and patriotic citizens. In 2015, Ûnarmiâ was founded to 
unite the country’s fragmented military-patriotic youth organiza-
tions. The movement’s aim was to operate in every school by 2020. 
By deconstructing the hegemonic discourse of military-patriotic 
education, I analyse the linguistic ways in which the legitimiza-
tion of Ûnarmiâ has been constructed. Discourses of heroism, 
masculinity, a beneficial and fun hobby, citizen-soldier and  military 
traditionalism include a variety of key strategies of legitimization 
for influencing audiences. Discourses suggest that Ûnarmiâ’s 
purpose is to raise patriotic citizens, who support the prevailing 
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regime and contribute to solving the demographic crisis by repeat-
ing ‘traditional’ gender roles, rather than preparing young people 
for war.
Keywords: military-patriotic education, Ûnarmiâ, Russia, patri-
otism, militarism
Introduction
We would like, and we will do it, to create hundreds and hundreds 
of centres for patriotic education, hundreds of Ûnarmiâ centres 
throughout the country. (Sergei Shoigu, RIA Novosti, 2016)
This chapter examines the establishment and legitimization of 
military-patriotic education as an element of militarization in 
Russia by analysing the meanings associated with Ûnarmiâ, the 
All-Russia National Military Patriotic Social Movement Asso-
ciation ‘Young Army’.1 In recent years in Russia, patriotism has 
increasingly meant militarism and preparing for war. However, 
this is not the only interpretation, as Lassila, Mitikka and Zavad-
skaya, and  Nazarenko show in their chapters in this volume. By 
deconstructing the hegemonic discourse of military-patriotic 
education, I analyse the linguistic ways in which legitimization 
of Ûnarmiâ is constructed. My research questions are: What does 
the re- emergence of military-patriotic education represent and 
what kinds of meanings does it acquire? How has the meaning 
of Ûnarmiâ been explained in official and semi-official contexts? 
How and why was it established? What kind of identities are 
formed and given to members of the movement?
Despite the scale of the rising patriotism in Russia, there is rela-
tively little research on military-patriotic education (see for exam-
ple Bækken, 2019; Laruelle, 2015; Rapoport, 2009; Sanina, 2017; 
Sieca-Kozlowski, 2010; Sperling, 2009), or research that combines 
gender and patriotism/militarism (for example Eichler, 2019; 
Kalinina, 2017; Riabov and Riabova, 2014). The rapid growth of 
Ûnarmiâ requires closer examination to understand the direction 
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of militarization processes among youth in Russia. My study pro-
vides new insights into that area.
I consider discourses in the macro-level context as a standard-
ized way of describing certain types of phenomena in society. In 
the research analysis, I apply critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
which is well suited to the material dealing with power relations. 
From a discursive perspective, texts always have many functions, 
as they represent the world and display social relationships and 
identities (Fairclough, 1997, p. 40). CDA is a tool to decode rela-
tionships between language and ideology, language and gender, 
and language and power. Often, studies employing CDA focus on 
the linguistic construction of national identity and the process of 
‘othering’ (Reyes, 2011), which are central for this study as well. 
In CDA, the discursive practices of each community are perceived 
as networks – which can be called the order of discourse. In the 
order of discourse, different discourses overlap and mix but can 
also be tightly separated (Fairclough, 1995, p. 77).
In the context of this study, it is assumed that the state actors 
are in a hegemonic position to define the objectives of military-
patriotic education and the meaning of Ûnarmiâ. In other words, 
owing to their authoritative position and entangled in its wider 
powers, they have a better ability to create and maintain spe-
cific discourses. I have divided this hegemonic ‘macrodiscourse’ 
into subdiscourses or groups of statements, which are all linked 
together but occur at various scales in different groups of the 
source material. These include: ‘heroism’, ‘masculinity’, ‘benefi-
cial and fun hobby’, ‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘military traditionalism’. 
The hegemonic discourse excludes different points of view. Such 
issues as pacifism, different pedagogical perspectives, youth’s 
own vision and voice, references to science and questioning the 
appropriateness of the movement are marginalized. Oppositional 
voices are almost muted in the mainstream media. However, as 
will be shown in this chapter, the fact that hegemonic discourse 
needs constant reinforcing and repeating indicates that it is not 
universally accepted and has an alternative, as has already been 
suggested in this volume.
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The rest of this chapter is organized in the following way. In the 
next section I will briefly describe the main concepts used in 
the research analysis and the research data. After that, I will dis-
cuss the historical formation of military-patriotic education in 
Russia and the emergence of Ûnarmiâ as an organization. This 
is then followed by the research analysis, where I distinguish a 
network of hegemonic discourses that legitimate the creation of 
Ûnarmiâ. In the concluding part of this chapter, I will identify 
specific linguistic ways used in support of hegemonic discourses 
and argue that the legitimation of Ûnarmiâ relies heavily on mili-
tary traditionalism and enemy images.
Research Framework: Key Concepts  
and Research Material
Key concepts: legitimization, ideology, identity
In this section I will introduce the key concepts used in the 
research analysis, which include legitimization, ideology and 
identity. Legitimization is here understood as a strategy employed 
by social actors to justify the development of military-patriotic 
education and related youth activities. The process of legitimiza-
tion is enacted by argumentation that takes advantage of social 
ideas, thoughts, actions and declarations. It is aimed to obtain or 
maintain power, to achieve social acceptance, to reach popularity 
and to improve community relationships. To achieve an interloc-
utor’s approval and support, the act of legitimization may appeal 
to emotions, rationality, hypothetical future,  expertise and altru-
ism (Reyes, 2011). Often, the process of legitimization strives to 
 connect the past, present and future into a  coherent  narrative. 
Political actors display the present as a period that requires mak-
ing decisions about taking action. These actions are related to a 
cause (in the past) and a consequence (may occur in the future) 
(Reyes, 2011). For example, in the research material, the Great 
Patriotic War represents ‘the past’, whereas ‘the upcoming war’ 
forms the possible future.
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Another key term used in this chapter is ideology, which 
has a significant role in processes through which relations of 
power are established, maintained, enacted and transformed 
(Fairclough, 1995, p. 26). According to Žižek, in the classical 
Marxist  definition, ideologies are discourses that promote false 
ideas or ‘consciousness’ in subjects about the political regimes 
they live in. However, this Marxist notion has been disputed in 
the  humanities, questioning that there could ever be any One such 
theoretically accessible Truth and that the notion of ideology is 
irrelevant to describe contemporary socio-political life, because 
of the widespread cynicism towards political authorities. On the 
other hand, subjects today can know political regimes’ false ideas 
very well but act as if they did not know (Sharpe, 2020) and I 
argue that this is very much true in contemporary Russia, where 
double standards familiar from the Soviet Union still exist at some 
levels of society.
Although the main emphasis of the study is on the meanings 
given to legitimacy, representations of identities that emerged 
during the analysis require also attention. Identities interact with 
ideological prescriptions about roles and relationships in specific 
domains of social action that assign preferred properties, desires 
and needs to individuals (Bamberg, Schiffrin and De Fina, 2006, p. 
135). This is a matter of social control. In each discourse presented 
later in this chapter, ‘correct’ values stand out strongly. Instead of 
a dialogue between youth and the authorities, the youth is repre-
sented as a mass that can be influenced in the desired direction. 
The discourses on Ûnarmiâ offer to the youth identities of a good 
citizen and a soldier. In addition, Russianness, traditional gender 
roles, self-sacrifice, humility, hard work and the pursuit of hero-
ism are the most important building blocks of Ûnarmiân identity.
The research material
To achieve a comprehensive understanding of how the estab-
lishment of Ûnarmiâ was received and what kind of arguments 
were given to it in Russian society, my data are selected from four 
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 different sources: the state’s official documents, military periodi-
cals, mainstream media and texts produced by Ûnarmiâ itself. 
As the movement was established in late 2015, I chose to review 
material from 2015 to the present day. Next, I will introduce the 
research material in more detail.
First, the State Patriotic Education Programmes (2001–2020) 
provide a basis for the hegemonic discourse. The military aspects 
of patriotic education have strengthened with every five-year state 
programme since 2001. Even in the first programme, the basis 
for the creation of the new youth organization was established, as 
there were plans to carry out military-historical, military- technical 
and military sports clubs and training centres (Patriotičeskoe vos-
pitanie graždan, 2001). It seems that over the years DOSAAF2 
has lost its leading position as a leading military-patriotic educa-
tor and has therefore made room for a new player. Practices of 
 military units over educational organizations have been strength-
ened continuously and today Ûnarmiâ fulfils most of the meas-
ures outlined in the programmes (ibid.; Patriotičeskoe vospitanie 
graždan, 2015).
In addition to these programmes, methodological handbooks 
for educational organizations (Practices of Interaction between 
Educational Organizations and Military-Patriotic Associations 
with Military Units and the Development of Interaction between 
Educational Organizations and Military-Patriotic Associations 
with Military Units) published by the Ministry of Education and 
Science proved to be an interesting source for discourse analysis as 
they justify military-patriotic education from many  perspectives.
However, although these programmes seem effective on 
paper, critics question their effectivity. Anna Sanina (2019) has 
argued that patriotic narratives emanating from the state pro-
grammes create an impression that the Kremlin has a centralized 
and  well-organized programme for supporting militarism and 
nationalism in Russia. In reality, there is no such grand design 
and the programmes lack concrete tools and meanings for pat-
riotism formation. Furthermore, despite certain seemingly noble 
goals, like the integration of less fortunate children into Russian 
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 society and the elimination of youth criminality, military-patri-
otic  programmes appear to have more narrow objectives, such as 
increasing the number of potential recruits to the armed forces 
and paramilitary units (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2019).
The second category of research material includes military jour-
nals that more often than not reflect and consolidate hegemonic 
discourses. The analysed articles are selected from the East View 
database, which contains over 40 major Russian military and secu-
rity publications. I chose articles from the years 2015–2020 with 
the word ‘Ûnarmiâ’ for a closer look from the journals Vestnik 
Akademii voennyh nauk (3 articles), Voenno-promyšlennyj kurʹer 
(17) and Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (14). In addition, I over-
viewed several articles from the Ministry of Defence’s newspaper 
Krasnaâ zvezda (803 articles), but, because of the large number of 
hits, I chose the articles for deeper analysis mainly based on their 
titles or whether I found references to them in other contexts.
The third type of research material is produced by the Ûnarmiâ 
organization and it is compiled from their website and social 
media accounts on Facebook and Instagram from the years 2015–
2020. Ûnarmiâ is especially active on Instagram and publishes 
daily information on its activities. Among hundreds of social 
media postings, I focused on the representations of identities and 
gender roles.
The fourth category includes mainstream media documents 
from the years 2015–2020 that I searched from Integrum. I selected 
the databases ‘Central press’ and ‘Regional press’. The search 
with the word ‘Ûnarmiâ’ returned 8,924 documents altogether. 
Owing to the large number of hits, I chose to take only Russia’s 
most-read daily newspapers (Statista, 2020) for further analysis, so 
I reviewed texts from Argumenty i Fakty (16 texts), Komsomolʹskaâ 
pravda (58), Izvestiâ (13) and Kommersant (17). I left out of the 
review the government’s newspaper Rossijskaâ gazeta, as well 
as Moskovskij komsomolec, which is one of Ûnarmiâ’s sponsors. 
These newspapers would hardly have brought any new perspec-
tive to discourse analysis but would have repeated hegemonic 
discourse familiar from the state documents. In fact, the material 
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from the  mainstream media and military periodicals saturated 
quite quickly – the discourses repeated themselves and new argu-
ments were rare and marginal.
The fifth and last category includes media reports and other 
material collected from popular newspapers and academic data-
bases, googling and navigating through sources from one article 
to another. With a basic knowledge of the Russian media field, 
I relied on my judgement when assessing the significance of 
sources. The research material collected in this way is not exhaus-
tive but offers a variety of texts and contrastive discourses for dis-
course analysis. Critical opinions and attitudes towards Ûnarmiâ 
are easily found from ‘opposition’ media like newspapers Novaâ 
gazeta and Meduza, but few authors also expressed them in the 
state-owned mainstream media.
Militarism and the Military-Patriotic  
Youth  Organizations in Russia
The centuries-long tradition of symbolic unity between the 
military and patriotism explains why the military rationale of 
patriotic education does not need to be explained: patriotic 
 education itself is a code phrase that implies military prepara-
tion, training and education (Rapoport, 2009). The Cambridge 
Dictionary (2020) defines militarism as ‘the belief that it is nec-
essary to have strong armed forces and that they should be used 
in order to win political or economic advantages’. Furthermore, 
Vagts (1959, p. 17) defines militarism as follows: ‘Militarism cov-
ers every system of thinking and valuing and every complex of 
feelings which rank military institutions and ways above the ways 
of civilian life, carrying military mentality and models of acting 
and decision into the civilian sphere.’ Militarization instead is ‘a 
concentration of men and materials on winning specific objec-
tives of power’ (ibid., p. 13). However, Håvard Bækken argues 
that military-patriotic education in post-Soviet Russia is a text-
book example of militarism. Patriotic education is an attempt to 
use the military to socialize youth into good human beings and 
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 citizens, which is not  necessarily related to war-fighting capa-
bilities. Even though the term militarism fits better with Russian 
patriotic  education as a whole, Ûnarmiâ is a very much related to 
‘war fighting’, and its members are subjugated to the needs of the 
army. Therefore, in my view, it is appropriate to use both terms.
The Soviet Union organized a massive propaganda cam-
paign focused on the need to prepare fighters for an ‘inevitable 
war’ (Sperling, 2009). Today, patriotic education penetrates all 
state and social institutions again and it is coordinated at the high-
est and the lowest levels of government (Omelchenko et al., 2015). 
In contrast to international scholarly analysis that has attributed 
patriotic education initiation to Vladimir Putin, Bækken (2019) 
argues that patriotic discourses were already formed in the 1990s 
in traditionalist circles within the Russian military, where the 
armed forces were seen as a bearer of historical continuity and 
‘Russianness’. Increasing the prestige of military service was not 
the only aim, but the fact that patriotic education served as a form 
of social outreach. Thus, moral values and social concerns are 
as important as military security in the current patriotic project 
(Bækken, 2019). My review of military periodicals supports these 
arguments. Military circles see patriotic education as a long con-
tinuation, where the turmoil following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was just an exception.
Ûnarmiâ is the latest version of military-patriotic youth organi-
zations established by the Kremlin. In 2000, in Putin’s first term, a 
first ‘presidential fan club’ ‘Iduŝie vmeste’ (‘Moving together’) was 
born to inculcate values of a regime in the youth. In the autumn 
of 2004, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine rose up and led to 
the creation of a bigger and nationwide organization, the Youth 
Democratic Anti-Fascist Movement ‘Naši’ (‘Ours’). Naši was the 
regime’s ideological vehicle, whose purpose was to create a new 
elite and prevent a colour revolution in Russia (van Herpen, 2015, 
pp. 123–135). Around 2007, Naši’s political importance decreased 
and finally flamed out, owing to its internal disintegration and 
loss of political power of its leaders, which also resulted in a loss of 
funding (Mijnssen, 2014, pp. 181–182). As the Kremlin’s  foreign 
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policy became more assertive after the annexation of Crimea, a 
new youth group was once again needed to better reflect this more 
militant approach, and Ûnarmiâ was born (Finch, 2019). Although 
Naši is not what is referred to in the Ûnarmiâ debate, the threats 
that these organizations should respond to resemble each other, 
e.g. Western values, colour revolutions and  oppositional move-
ments in Russia.
Besides openly political youth organizations, several military-
patriotic organizations that existed in the Soviet Union have 
been revived or expanded in the Russian Federation, includ-
ing the Suvorov military and Nakhimov naval school, the cadet 
corps, Cossack military schools, the Society for Cooperation 
with the Army, Aviation and Navy (DOSAAF) and the Ready 
for Labour and Defence (GTO) training system. Since 2013, girls 
have been allowed to apply to many of these traditional boys’ 
military  educational institutions (Yandex, 2020), which may indi-
cate that the role of women in war work is changing. Also, thou-
sands of  private or regional patriotic clubs are extremely diverse 
in Russia and many of them describe themselves with an addi-
tional  adjective – cultural, military, civic, Orthodox or historical 
(Laruelle, 2015). Ûnarmiâ is somewhere between these traditional 
military schools, hobby clubs and political projects. In the consti-
tutive meeting of Ûnarmiâ, members of the board considered it 
important that Ûnarmiâ not be involved in politics (Mironovič, 
2016), which in turn is ridiculous as it is clear that Ûnarmiâ sup-
ports the current regime and vice versa. Still, the history with Naši 
has been learned and Ûnarmiâ is now more firmly tied to stable 
institutions like DOSAAF and the Ministry of Defence to avoid 
political fluctuations.
Establishment of Ûnarmiâ and Its Main Activities
Ûnarmiâ was formally established by the Minister of Defence 
of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, on 29 October 2015, 
the anniversary of the founding of Komsomol, which is hardly 
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a  coincidence. Any 8- to 17-year-old student, military-patriotic 
club or search squad can voluntarily join the movement. As of 
 September 2020, Ûnarmiâ had over 719,000 members (Ûnarmiâ, 
2020). The authorities announced that the goal is to increase the 
number of members to one million this year (Radio Svoboda, 
2019), but the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have slowed 
growth, unless the target was already too ambitious.
The term ‘Ûnarmiâ’ was already used during the Civil War in 
1917 to denote underage participants. In the Soviet era, the term 
referred to teams in Pioneers’ military games ‘Zarnica’ and ‘Orle-
nok’ (Vološinov, 1989, pp. 3–33). Another meaning for Ûnarmiâ 
was born when, from the mid-1960s, children’s clubs under the 
Pioneers' umbrella organization spread the memory of the Great 
Patriotic War (Popkov, 2016). In the late 1980s, the Ûnarmiâ 
movement loosely united small military-patriotic clubs, created 
on the basis of organizations of Great Patriotic War veterans 
(Meduza, 2016; Omelchenko et al., 2015). Today’s Ûnarmiâ is an 
official organization strictly controlled by the state. Still, it calls 
itself a movement, which creates an illusion of a bottom-up struc-
tured NGO.
In Ûnarmiâ’s main message, citizenship has been elevated over 
military content, as ‘Ûnarmiâ’s mission is to raise citizens and 
patriots and teach the child an active civic position. Furthermore, 
Ûnarmiâ forms a positive motivation to fulfil the constitutional 
duty and prepares young men for service in the Armed Forces of 
the Russian Federation. The movement prepares its members to 
enter the military universities of the country, where they receive 
free higher education and social support from the Ministry of 
Defence. (Ûnarmiâ, 2020.) Thus, it offers its members a social rise 
in society.
Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu justified the establishment of 
Ûnarmiâ by saying that:
To make young people protect Russia with weapons in their 
hands, the readiness and willingness to serve must be born in 
childhood and adolescence. To form a positive attitude towards 
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the army as a public institution and military affairs as an  
occupation, the state must participate systematically, with all 
relevant resources in military-patriotic work. (Eliseeva and 
Tihonov, 2016)
Ûnarmiâ’s activities are divided into four parts: spiritual and 
moral development, social development, physical and sports 
development, and intellectual development (Ûnarmiâ, 2020). 
Despite the ‘civilian’ core message, every action includes a  military 
starting point. While collectivism is emphasized in rhetoric, 
its competitive and athletic nature cuts across all activities of 
the movement, revealing that the intention is to highlight 
talented individuals.
Powerful sponsors behind the scheme
Although Ûnarmiâ belongs administratively under the mili-
tary-patriotic wing of the Russian Movement of Schoolchildren 
(RMS), the Ministry of Defence has taken the key role as leader 
and organizer of Ûnarmiâ (Popkov, 2016). Ûnarmiâ has many 
partners and sponsors, such as Russia’s state-owned bank Sber-
bank, TV companies Zvezda and Rossiâ 24, newspaper Moskovskij 
komsomolec and many other state-related companies and admin-
istrations (Ûnarmiâ, 2020). One of the main sponsors of Ûnarmiâ 
may be related to Evgenij Prigožin, the sanctioned oligarch who 
is also behind the notorious private military company Wagner 
Group (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2019). In particular, the produc-
tion of the movement’s uniforms is associated with Prigožin 
(Radio Svoboda, 2018).
Typically, the head of the regional Ûnarmiâ organization is a for-
mer silovik or a person close to the security forces, who is a part of 
the regional ruling elite or loyal to them (Sanina, 2017, p. 113). The 
infrastructure of the movement is tied to the locations of military 
units, DOSAAF and the central sports club of the army. Ûnarmiâ 
cooperates with relevant clubs of young  rescuers, young guards, 
young police assistants and traffic  inspectors and the movements 
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of the Russian Cossacks. Statistics on how many Ûnarmiâns 
join the troops are closely monitored. In 2019, the number was 
1,000 and the tendency to increase continues (Mišina, 2019). The 
 central venue for Ûnarmiâ’s events is the Russian armed forces’ 
‘Park Patriot’, a huge military-themed park opened in 2016 near 
Moscow, where ‘everything is permeated with patriotism’ (Park 
Patriot, 2019). Similar parks are being planned all over Russia. In 
the year 2020, ‘Ûnarmiâ houses’, where the kids can study after 
school, are being set up in all regions, in each garrison and cul-
tural institutions, as well as in regional centres of military-patri-
otic education and preparation of citizens for military service 
(Cygankov, 2019).
For the year 2020, Ûnarmiâ has planned 276 different pro-
jects and events. For example, Ûnarmiâ’s social advertising will 
be placed on the streets of Moscow and other cities, and the 
movement will organize the work ‘Immortal Regiment of My 
School’ in educational institutions nationwide and participate 
in the spring and autumn in rituals of sending conscripts to 
military service locations (Ûnarmejskij god, 2020). Foreign 
policy enters the picture, as the movement will establish new 
units at the embassies of the Russian Federation abroad in 2020 
(ibid.). Ûnarmiâ is supposed to operate in every school in 
2020 (Novye izvestiâ, 2019). Schools are expected to open a 
room for study and recreation for students who have joined 
Ûnarmiâ. The room must contain certain types of equipment, 
a picture of President Vladimir Putin, samples of small arms, a 
map, a flag of Russia etc. The annexation of Crimea is strongly 
present in Ûnarmiâ’s educational materials and visual imagery. 
These details remind of the Soviet era, when in the 1970s and the 
1980s in the Soviet Union each educational institution had to 
have the same kind of educational material base (Sanina, 2017, 
pp. 110–113). It seems as if Ûnarmiâ is wanted as a permanent 
institution in society, like Komsomol was. That is why the ideo-
logical commitment of the individual member is not so impor-
tant, because as many young people as possible are involved. Of 
course, there always exist ideological components, but it seems 
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that Ûnarmiâ’s core is more educational than Naši’s ideological 
and political actions.
Recruitment takes place in primary schools
The movement recruits young people directly from the schools. 
Ûnarmiâ’s social media posts often glorify the classes in which 
each student has joined the movement. The head of Ûnarmiâ, 
Roman Romanenko, says that the recruitment process has become 
so efficient that it is no longer possible to stop it, as the kids keep 
inviting new friends to the movement (Èho Moskvy, 2019). The 
movement has several factors to attract new members. Visuality is 
widely used in symbols, artefacts and clothes. The Ûnarmiâ online 
store consists of 95 different military-style clothes and accesso-
ries, the prices of which are high compared to average salaries 
(Magazin Ûnarmiâ, 2020). Most of the members buy uniforms 
by themselves, but some regional departments offer them for 
free (Zajcev, 2019). Several sports heroes, actresses and warlords 
work in Ûnarmiâ or appear in its events, being role models for 
young people and bringing visibility to the organization. The big 
carrot is that more than 20 Russian universities already award 
extra points in their entrance exams to students who belong or 
have belonged to Ûnarmiâ (Èho Moskvy, 2019). Although mem-
bership of Ûnarmiâ is officially voluntary, there is an informal 
obligation to join for the children of military personnel, public 
servants and defence industry employees (Estonian Foreign Intel-
ligence Service, 2020), as well for orphanage children, whose cus-
todian is the state. Novaâ gazeta notes that the same phenomenon 
as in the USSR, when Komsomol came to orphanages, is being 
repeated today (Tarasov, 2019). This kind of measure originates 
in  revolutionary history, when the Cheka3 created the Emergency 
Commission for taking charge of orphans, who later came to form 
a large part of the NKVD officers.4 The phenomenon is not new 
in this century either, as a presidential decree in 2000 renewed the 
tradition, putting the army in charge of dealing with social prob-
lems not taken on by the state (Sieca-Kozlowski, 2010).
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The Legitimating Discourses of Ûnarmiâ
Earlier in this volume, Jussi Lassila and Salla Nazarenko intro-
duced several different perceptions of patriotism in Russia. Jussi 
Lassila distinguishes between two interpretations of patriotism in 
the context of youth socialization. In a broad view, patriotism is 
seen as a nexus of all good things that must be fostered further. 
The narrow approach urges us not to forget the ultimate goal of all 
patriotism – preparation for military service, and indeed for war. 
In my discourse analysis, perhaps surprisingly the broad approach 
dominates, even though Ûnarmiâ is a paramilitary organization. 
Nazarenko, in turn, distinguished three narratives of patriotism 
among Russian TV journalists: intimate patriotism, military patri-
otism and infowar patriotism. From the perspective of these find-
ings, the narrative of military patriotism is the most dominant in 
my material, but I have named it military traditionalism, in order 
to emphasize the role of history in the legitimization of mili-
tary-patriotic education. Taken together, discourses of military- 
patriotic education analysed in this chapter follow the golden 
mean: they are not as pacifist as intimate patriotism can be, but 
not so belligerent as infowar patriotism or the above-mentioned 
narrow approach entails.
Heroism: self-sacrifice for the honour  
and glory of Russia
If Ûnarmiâ were described in one word, it could be heroism. The 
word and its derivatives, ‘hero and heroic’, are repeated more in 
Ûnarmiâ’s discourses than anything else. Heroism encompasses 
many things, like pride, self-sacrifice and faith. By taking an oath, 
a member joins Ûnarmiâ, in which he or she promises to prepare 
him/herself to serve the Fatherland. According to the code of the 
movement, the honour and glory of Russia are the highest val-
ues of Ûnarmiâ (Kodeks Ûnarmiâ, 2018). Heroism is linked to 
‘Russia’s special position in the world’. As the military periodical 
Voenno-promyšlennyj kurʹer writes,
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At the time of the formation of the Ûnarmiâ, the aims of patri-
otic ideology were discussed: The new ideology was seen to unite 
the vectors of interests of the state, society and the evolutionarily 
developing biosphere, which must lead to an increase existence of 
Russians and Russia on Earth. (Sokolov, 2016)
Sacrifice is another concept intrinsically linked to heroic dis-
course. It can be associated with religious (Russia) or secular 
(Soviet Union) discourses. In the Soviet official commemorative 
culture, children and adolescents – young partisans, little soldiers 
adopted by Soviet army units, helpers of the underground resist-
ance – were used as icons of heroic sacrifice and patriotism (Zhur-
zhenko, 2017).
In Chapter 10 in this volume, Elina Kahla points to the current 
church–state–military collaboration model, which glorifies blood 
sacrifice and argues that new martyrs strike as of ultimate signifi-
cance for Russian society’s identity formation. The Moscow Patri-
archate sees that future warriors need not only patriotic education 
but ‘the constant connection with God to maintain their morale, 
which can be achieved by developing a link between church and 
state’ (Russkaâ Pravoslavnaâ Cerkovʹ, 2015). The church strength-
ens the importance of self-sacrifice as part of the heroism in the 
name of faith. Unlike Ûnarmiâ’s Soviet predecessors, religion is 
present in the movement’s material as members, for example, pose 
beside icons (see e.g. Ûnarmiâ Instagram, 2019a). Another exam-
ple of sacrifice discourse is the project ‘Pioneers–Heroes of the 
Great Patriotic War’, which started at the beginning of 2020 on 
Ûnarmiâ’s Instagram and Facebook accounts. The project presents 
young people and children who lost their lives while protecting 
their homeland. Thus far, the stories of over 50 children have been 
presented. Here is one example.
After the death of his father at age 13, Valera Volkov becomes the 
‘son of a regiment’ in the 7th Marine Brigade. Along with adults, 
with a weapon in his hands, he restrains the attacks of the enemy. 
According to memoirs of fellow soldiers, he loved poetry and 
often read Maâkovskij for his comrade. … In July 1942, reflect-
ing an enemy attack, he died heroically, throwing a bunch of 
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 grenades under the advancing tank. For courage and bravery, he 
was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 
1st degree. (Ûnarmiâ Facebook, 2020)
Heroism through self-sacrifice is not only yesterday’s business. 
Last year, Ria Novosti (2019) reported on a heroic 13-year-old 
Ûnarmiân boy, Dima, who saved two children from drowning 
but died himself. Ria Novosti described how ‘Dima dreamed of 
becoming a soldier to protect people’. These narratives and image-
ries of children as heroic little soldiers have increased heavily in 
Russia in recent years to support the state-led militarization.
Masculinity: gendered warfare adores ‘real men’
In the Soviet Union, ideal masculinity materialized in the mythic 
image of a soldier, a young pioneer working for the greater good 
of his nation, while the feminine ideal was a young and active 
woman and fertile mother giving birth to new soldiers (Kalinina, 
2017). Today, Oleg Riabov and Tatiana Riabova have argued, an 
important factor contributing to the authorities’ high popular-
ity is the ‘remasculinization of Russia’ – the politics of identity 
directed towards creating a positive collective identity with the 
help of gender discourse, particularly by promulgating masculine 
images of Russia. Politics of identity conducted by the new Rus-
sian authorities under Putin had to take into consideration the 
demands of the 1990s’ nationalist and communist oppositions, 
who called to restore collective male dignity, for the restoration 
of national pride. The Russian mass media masculinizes Putin’s 
image with the help of militarization – Putin is represented as a 
military serviceman (among other caricatured images). Histori-
cally, warfare has played a crucial role in determining what ‘being 
a real man’ is all about at the symbolic, institutional and corpo-
real levels (Riabov and Riabova, 2014). Furthermore, militarism 
as an ideology values the military and its members over society. 
Militarism relies on, reproduces and helps justify hierarchical and 
unequal gender roles and relations. Militarized femininity is a 
contradictory construction, in which female soldiers are seen as 
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equal to, and still different from, male soldiers. This reproduces 
masculinity as the norm of soldiering rather than acknowledging 
women as soldiers in their own right (Eichler, 2019).
Even though Ûnarmiâ’s mission is to prepare the boys for the 
army, many girls belong to the movement. Girls are constantly 
represented in the movement’s pictures and texts, but, in the 
absence of official figures, it is not clear what percentage of mem-
bers are women. The proportion of women in Ûnarmiâ has raised 
the question of whether the role of females in the Russian military 
context is growing and how it is changing. Women are not subject 
to general conscription but can serve under contract. At present, 
40,000 women are serving as soldiers and about 280,000 women 
hold civilian posts in the Russian armed forces, and the number 
is increasing (Krasnaâ zvezda, 2019). Despite ostensible gender 
equality, Ûnarmiâ is strictly gendered. The movement organizes, 
for example, the beauty contest ‘Miss Ûnarmiâ’ and, at balls, girls 
wear prom dresses while boys keep their Ûnarmiân uniforms. One 
interesting detail is that many Ûnarmiân girls wear bantiki – white 
and puffy hair bows – which became part of (gendered) school 
uniforms in the Soviet Union in the 1940s. The bows became a 
symbol of idealized Soviet childhood, reflecting national prosper-
ity, development and happiness (Millei et al., 2019). Ûnarmiâ has 
regularized the use of bantikis again.
However, masculinity and femininity do not follow the same 
classification as the division into women and men. Women can 
have ‘masculine’ qualities, for example braveness, strength and 
power, which are always positive ‘extra qualities’. For example, 
one female chief of a regional Ûnarmiâ headquarters is described 
in a social media post as follows: ‘this fragile and sweet woman 
has a strong character and enough courage to lead a whole region’s 
Ûnarmiâns’ (Ûnarmiâ Instagram, 2019b). These examples reveal 
that, women can ‘grow up’ in the ranks of Ûnarmiâ and attain 
qualities considered traditionally masculine, but they must remain 
feminine: fragile, sweet and beautiful. The opposite situation is 
not positive or even possible in discourses of Ûnarmiâ. Boys have 
to become ‘men’ who under no circumstances should have ‘weak’ 
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feminine attributes or qualities like fragility. This kind of educa-
tion is in line with the ‘traditional gender roles’ that are nowadays 
promoted strongly in Russian society. In summary, women can be 
involved in militarized projects like Ûnarmiâ and be equal with 
men as soldiers, but the default is that they must remain feminine 
and thereby support masculinity.
Fertility is strongly tied to the need to develop military- patriotic 
education and it is thereby linked to gender issues. Demographic 
problems need to be solved to achieve a larger draft pool (Sper-
ling, 2009). The conservative party of the Orthodox Church is also 
eager to participate in this project. The state’s military-patriotic 
goals are logically linked to the traditional gender roles promoted 
in the Orthodox Church. The church became a social tool sup-
porting the state’s initiatives in the realm of family, motherhood, 
social problems and children’s and youth education (Adamsky, 
2019, pp. 175–177). The issue of fertility rates is not easily notice-
able in Ûnarmiâ’s material but it is a major component of ‘tra-
ditional Russian values’ upon which patriotic programmes and 
Ûnarmiâ are based. Ûnarmiâ encourages youth to take on a tradi-
tional lifestyle that includes a spouse (opposite sex), a family with 
kids, a healthy lifestyle, religion and a military or civilian career. 
This in turn is linked to the ‘beneficial hobby’ discourse, which 
emphasizes athletic and healthy lifestyle. Let us now turn to it.
A beneficial and fun hobby for everybody
When browsing Ûnarmiâ’s material on social media, it is clear 
that this discourse is the number one means of rhetoric aimed 
at young people and their parents. My findings from Ûnarmiâ’s 
material and military periodicals support those of Bækken (2019) 
and Sieca-Kozlowski (2010) that patriotic education is seen as 
a means to save youth from criminality, alcohol, drugs and the 
influence of television and social media. Alongside basic mili-
tary training, the Kremlin wants to offer via Ûnarmiâ a greater 
structure, discipline and guidance for today’s younger genera-
tion, among which  suicide rates are high, alcohol and drug abuse 
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remain a problem, and gangs are growing – particularly linked 
with social media (Finch, 2019).
Ûnarmiâ’s peaceful goal has been emphasized in the movement’s 
social media texts, in which Ûnarmiâ is presented as a developing 
hobby for children and youth. Any kind of military matter is seen 
as a fun and adventurous thing. As Sergei Shoigu put it in Kom-
mersant, ‘through the army and DOSAAF, Ûnarmiâ gets access 
to all the joys of military service’; he continues that ‘you will have 
the opportunity to fly aeroplanes and jump on a parachute, dive 
underwater and cruise on our warships and submarines, shoot 
with everything that shoots, except with rockets’ (Berseneva, 
2016). Joy is related to Soviet nostalgia. The military periodical 
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie rejoices that ‘in Soviet patriotic 
summer camps, one could hold a real machine gun and feel like 
a real hero’ and that by now ‘Russian children can fulfil these and 
other wildest dreams by joining the Ûnarmiâ’ (Nezavisimoe voen-
noe obozrenie, 2017).
Besides joy, the beneficial and fun hobby discourse empha-
sizes useful and practical civic skills. It gives hints of a beneficial 
future, where the citizen with a history in Ûnarmiâ can expect 
better advantages than others, like having a good physical condi-
tion and everyday skills or having a career in the government or 
the  military.
When it comes to the needs of young people, adults get the floor 
in every discourse. The material reveals that authors and adults 
know naturally what youth is like, and they want to share their 
childhood memories with contemporary youth. The approach 
is paternal and sceptical through the material. For example, the 
author of a military journal criticizes youth by saying that ‘it is 
very problematic to raise a citizen and patriot of teenagers with 
empty files in their heads’ (ibid.), and continues that, ‘because 
of the fear of maintaining a communist ideology, patriotic edu-
cation was abandoned as well’. The talk of ‘empty files’ reveals 
 disappointment with ‘digital native’ young people.
The contradiction to the joy is that military-patriotic education 
can be used as a punishment. The Russian Ministry of  Internal 
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Affairs has intensified the work to develop measures to pre-
vent crimes related to the manipulation of the minds of minors 
through social networks. Young people who commit these crimes 
are sent to military-patriotic camps (Argumenty i Fakty, 2019). 
This reveals the ideological emphasis of the project and ques-
tions its voluntary nature and ‘fun’. These measures draw lines for 
appropriate citizenship, which I will discuss next.
Citizen-soldier: the ideal of a new citizen
The representation of identity is an instrument of power. Pat-
riotism as an official ideology of Russia forms ideal identities. 
Ûnarmiâ’s discourses form a clear representation of a desirable or 
ideal identity. The ideal Ûnarmiân is patriotic, collective, athletic, 
traditional, active, spontaneous within limits, ready to fight and 
self-sacrifice, a proud Russian who knows the country’s history 
and respects it. All these qualities are easily found in patriotic dis-
courses, but they are highlighted in Ûnarmiâ’s communication.
The Russian state wants patriotism to combine an idea of a mul-
tinational ‘all-Russian’ country as a core value and the  meaning of 
life (Ministerstvo obrazovaniâ i nauki Rossijskoj Federacii, 2017a). 
This might be difficult to achieve, as Mitikka and  Zavadskaya 
(Chapter 6, this volume) show that people consider themselves 
more ‘local patriots’ who value the malaâ rodina (regional home-
land), while the whole of Russia is too ‘abstract’ to be represented. 
Furthermore, ‘traditional norms of Russian society like moral 
education, being hardworking, knowledgeable and respectful of 
one’s own and other nations’ culture, are based on the ideas of 
serving Fatherland’ (Ministerstvo obrazovaniâ i nauki  Rossijskoj 
Federacii, 2017b). Although these norms are quite universal in 
many countries, why does Russia feel the need to instil these values 
increasingly on young people? One military periodical explains 
that, ‘without patriotism, the youth could be modern, prospec-
tive and effectively developing, but lose its identity and itself as a 
nation in a difficult modern situation’ (Astanini, 2016). The writer 
adds that ‘young people must love their motherland like their own 
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mother: the mother may not always be right, she might be too 
strict, but she’s a mother’. Such an argument emphasizes that one 
should love his/her homeland, regardless of how it treats him/her. 
Citizens must be humble.
For an Ûnarmiân it is ‘unacceptable to be lazy at work and study, 
to behave illegally, to interfere with normal communication or to 
provoke violations of the law and standards of public morality, 
advocate the values of subcultures that erode the foundations of 
the national culture of Russia, participate in youth and other pub-
lic associations promoting extremist ideology or asocial lifestyle, 
distort the state language of the Russian Federation and its constit-
uent republics and use of slang speech’ (Kodeks Ûnarmiâ, 2018). 
Rules are strict and prohibition of being interested in ‘subcultures 
against national culture’, ‘interference with normal communica-
tion’ and an ‘asocial lifestyle’ tells us about attempts to guide and 
limit youth culture without specifying what these vague concepts 
mean in each (political) situation.
One of the most important tasks of military-patriotic education 
is to ensure the national security of the country by increasing the 
prestige of military service. According to the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Science, despite the fact that 80% of young people have 
a positive attitude towards military service, there are still many 
who consider service ‘a meaningless occupation that should be 
avoided’. The ministry believes these numbers indicate the need 
for more thorough military-patriotic work ‘to root out pacifist 
sentiments in children and youth’ (Ministerstvo obrazovaniâ i 
nauki Rossijskoj Federacii, 2017b). This fragment reveals pacifism 
as an unwanted ideology in society: a good citizen cannot be a 
pacifist. These official documents assume that the reader (citizen) 
shares the same original assumption of the danger of pacifism and 
the importance of early military-patriotic education. At the same 
time it makes clear that pacifism is something that must be natu-
rally left out of the debate. This shows that hegemonic discourse is 
limited, even though it might create the picture of extensive dis-
cussion in society. Soldiers are the chief example of today’s patri-
ots to emulate (Bækken, 2019). When history writing in Russia 
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increasingly means that victorious military history and military-
patriotic education intertwine with the school schedule, the sol-
dier and the citizen become one.
The confrontation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is also present when 
discussing what a good citizen is like. Liberals are increasingly 
treated as the current power elite, as we have seen in arrests and 
harsh sentences that followed protests in Moscow in 2019. The 
online newspaper Russkaâ planeta writes that ‘the so-called patri-
otic camp considers Ûnarmiâ an excellent institution for educat-
ing the younger generation, while liberals see it as propaganda of 
militarism and the cult of the Kalashnikov’ (Zajcev, 2019). The 
phrases ‘propaganda of militarism’ and ‘cult of the Kalashnikov’ 
have negative connotations and imply that the liberals are over-
reacting. At the same time they set the ‘patriotic camp’ as the 
‘normal’  position – patriots are naturally and already within the 
frame of common sense. This confrontation is also present in 
Ûnarmiâ’s code, which calls for ‘to show tact and attentiveness in 
dealing with persons not participating in the movement’ (Kodeks 
Ûnarmiâ, 2018). Here ‘we’, i.e. patriots, are represented as some-
thing more intelligent and fairer than ‘others’, and therefore have 
a responsibility to behave discreetly towards others, who, reading 
between the lines, not may know ‘the right way’.
Military traditionalism
Military traditionalism is an undertone of the military-patriotic 
education in present-day Russia (Bækken, 2019). This discourse 
was especially strengthened before celebrating the 75th anniver-
sary of victory in the Second World War and the new constitu-
tional amendments in 2020. Besides ‘traditions’, this discourse 
effectively exploits threat and enemy images to legitimate mili-
tary-patriotic education among youth.
The Russian military press has called for years for a return to 
‘Russianness’ in the traditional sense by using a certain framing, 
language and rhetoric. Discourses that rely on epic and glori-
ous military history and traditions help to transcend ethnic and 
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religious borders and are useful to the regime, as military values 
such as discipline, collectivism, self-sacrifice and hierarchy guide 
society towards political loyalty (Bækken, 2019). The tradition-
alist worldview contains nostalgia and historical memory, which 
both lean on the prestige of the Russian military. Young people 
are expected to respect the older generations by embracing this 
nostalgia and participating in a similar patriotic education that 
older generations did.
One task of Ûnarmiâ is participating in the ‘revitalization of 
historical information space’, where ‘the Western nations practice 
total confrontation’ (Tonkoškurov, 2016). This ‘revitalization’ is 
more a tool than a concept: schools’ history textbooks are being 
revamped and the regime tries to block false information about 
the Second World War on the internet. As the military periodical 
Voenno-promyšlennyj kurʹer put it, ‘the enemy wants to tarnish the 
most beloved memory of the Russian people – the Great Patriotic 
War. Its main target group is youth, and through the mass media, 
it strikes a wedge between generations. In the fight against this 
special attention must be paid to develop the Ûnarmiâ’ (Mišina, 
2019). Izvestiâ writes that  ‘Russia needs an active, total, offensive 
and patriotic historical policy that encompasses everything – the 
family, kindergarten, schools, universities, as well as cinema, the 
internet, the media and  literature’ (Ilʹnickij,  2015). Nezavisimaâ 
gazeta explains the relationship between the armed forces and his-
torical memory in patriotic education by writing that ‘the Russian 
armed forces need only citizens, who can consciously defend state 
interests, which is possible only if they haven’t lost their historical 
memory’ (Odnokolenko, 2016).
Enemy images in military-patriotic education context follow 
the Kremlin’s general threat-based political climate, which is dis-
cussed in more detail earlier in this volume (see Pynnöniemi, 
Chapter 4, and Laine, Chapter 3). My material reveals the kind 
of threats that are seen to exist specifically against youth. The big-
gest and the most abstract and uncontrolled threat is ‘globaliza-
tion’, which in patriotic rhetoric means mainly Western values 
and the uncontrollable internet, giving the word merely negative 
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 connotations. According to the Ministry of Education and Sci-
ence, ‘Globalization is leading to the displacing national mass cul-
ture and replacing personal communication between people by 
electronic communications. It has given birth to nationalist senti-
ments, which sometimes cross the line of national identity and 
turn into national chauvinism that requires a consistent fight with 
fascist ideas’ (Ministerstvo obrazovaniâ i nauki Rossijskoj Feder-
acii, 2017b). The military periodical Voenno-promyšlennyj kurʹer 
wants Ûnarmiâ to be the authority in this ‘total information con-
frontation’, in order to educate citizens (Ilûŝenko, 2017).
Later the same periodical opens up the enemy image:
With the help of modern mass media and networks, the NATO 
and its allies seek to reformat the individual, group and mass con-
sciousness of the Russian population in the way that they need 
for themselves. Therefore, the main object of defeat and destruc-
tion is not people themselves, but certain types of consciousness. 
Its main target group is youth, and through the mass media, it 
strikes a wedge between generations. In the fight against this, spe-
cial attention must be paid to military-patriotic education and 
the key here is to develop the Ûnarmiâ. (Cygankov, 2019)
Another periodical, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, goes on 
the same lines, as, ‘because of the complete lack of control on the 
part of the state and society in terms of ideology, it is necessary 
to constantly post on social networks photo and video materials 
covering the work of various patriotic public associations such as 
Ûnarmiâ’ (Astanini, 2016). In summary, Russian military circles’ 
attitude towards the internet and global freedom of communica-
tion is reprehensible, and their attempt to limit ‘non-traditional’ 
information for young people is clear.
In addition to the fight against the negative effects of globaliza-
tion, Ûnarmiâ is thought to play a preventive role in maintaining 
the stability of society. The writers of the journal Vestnik Aka-
demii Voennykh Nauk argue that at the federal level the organiza-
tion is a good weapon in the fight against colour revolutionary 
ideologies. They write that ‘the formation of the correct attitude 
274 Nexus of  Patriotism and Militarism in Russia
of  schoolchildren and students to state and municipal authorities 
can be achieved by organizing joint events, which allow authori-
ties to begin the process of building trust in state at all levels and 
will help counteract protest moods in the youth environment’ 
(Sasim and Kovalev, 2018). Furthermore, ‘democratization pro-
cesses’ in domestic politics are seen as a threat and ‘the emer-
gence of a multi-party system creates certain difficulties for mod-
ern youth to understand the older generation, that has received 
 patriotic education of Soviet system’ (Ministerstvo obrazovaniâ 
i nauki Rossijskoj Federacii, 2017a). This argument reveals that 
youth must understand older generations and adapt to them, not 
vice versa.
In Conclusion: Interpretations and Discussion
This chapter aimed to provide an overview of the re-emergence 
of military-patriotic education in Russia, and, by deconstruct-
ing the state hegemonic discourse, analyse the linguistic ways in 
which the legitimization of Ûnarmiâ is constructed. I presented 
five  discourses, which strongly overlap and interact. Discourses 
of heroism, masculinity, a beneficial and fun hobby, citizen-soldier 
and military traditionalism approach different audiences and 
repeat and support the state-led ideology of patriotism. Discourses 
include a variety of key strategies of legitimization for influencing 
audiences.
Heroism is the tip of all communication, and it is shared by all 
actors. In Ûnarmiâ’s material, a beneficial and fun hobby discourse 
dominates, naturally because its target audience is minors and 
their parents. This discourse differs from others in its pragmatism 
when others are more ideological and abstract. Newspapers and 
state documents emphasize citizen-soldier discourse, and military 
periodicals stress military traditionalism. Masculinity cuts across 
all other discourses but is mainly hidden between the lines as it is 
such a naturalized initial assumption in society. However, when it 
mixes with the hobby discourse at the practical level, it becomes 
visible to the reader.
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So, what do these discourses mean in the legitimization process? 
Reyes (2011) differentiates five key strategies for influencing audi-
ences: emotions (particularly fear), a hypothetical future, ration-
ality, voices of expertise and altruism. Every military-patriotic 
discourse uses these specific linguistic ways in order to obtain the 
approval of a particular group.
Emotions are key in the legitimization process because they pre-
pare the audience towards supporting and accepting the proposal 
of the social actor (ibid.). Fear is the most visible means in mili-
tary traditionalism discourse: upcoming war, internal disruption, 
the decay of the West, the loss of traditional values and lazy youth 
arouse fear. Emotions are also in use when the speaker and audi-
ence are in the ‘us-group’ and the social actors described nega-
tively form the ‘them-group’ (ibid.). This division is rooted deeply 
in military-patriotic rhetoric. Ûnarmiâns are represented as ‘best 
patriots’ – they dedicate themselves to ideology, give their time and 
publicly demonstrate their commitment. I like to argue that threats 
that Ûnarmiâ is expected to respond to have slightly changed over 
the past five years. At the time of the establishment of movement, 
the threats were mostly perceived as external. Over the past years, 
talk of patriots and liberals as opposing groups has increased in the 
military-patriotic context, so the meaning of ‘them’ has changed 
from external to internal, which may mean that the response to 
external threats is already at the required level, or that internal 
problems have increased in society. Nostalgia also strongly affects 
emotions. Soviet nostalgia, traditional values and the older gener-
ation’s own experiences of (militarized) youth are present in many 
discourses. Nostalgia hits the emotions of the older generation, 
while young people are offered excitement as an emotion, mostly 
in the beneficial and fun hobby discourse. Emotions, especially 
fear, are often naturally used with a hypothetical future: if we do 
not act as we suggest, there will be a war/decay/demographic cri-
sis etc.
It is a matter of rationality when political actors present the 
legitimization process as a process where decisions have been 
made after a heeded, evaluated and thoughtful procedure (Reyes, 
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2011). This strategy cuts the whole hegemonic discourse, where 
the  proposed measures are effectively naturalized at the language 
level.  Military-patriotic education is presented as an only rational 
way to act in the current situation. The grounds for this are sought 
from a long continuum and history of military-patriotic education, 
giving the impression that things have been studied and  prepared 
for a long time. Voices of expertise is related to this.  Military pat-
riotism is driven by the most influential figures in society. From 
the researcher’s perspective, there is a lack of credible scientific 
research of military-patriotic education, and this vacuum is filled 
by ‘experts by experience’ in various fields. Sports heroes, celebri-
ties and veterans represent this strategy in communication tar-
geted at young people.
Ûnarmiâ’s activities include helping the poor, veterans and 
orphans. Social media reports on these events prominently, but 
it seems that helping is individual acts or events rather than con-
stant collaboration. This leads us to the last legitimization strat-
egy, altruism, which justifies its rationale from other people’s 
well-being. Doing things for others, especially for the poor and 
vulnerable, is well-perceived in society and can help the process 
of justification (ibid.).
In summary, discourses and legitimization strategies work 
simultaneously to get different audiences interested and accept the 
actions of military-patriotic education. If we summarize what 
the aim of each discourse is, then, according to military tradition-
alism, Ûnarmiâ’s purpose is a revitalization of historical informa-
tion space and preparing citizens for the army. Citizen-soldier 
discourse wants to raise patriotic and loyal citizens.  Heroism 
encourages self-sacrifice and heroism – to take risks for the 
Fatherland. Beneficial and fun hobby seeks to make youth active, 
professional and militarized. Lastly, masculinity discourse puts 
pressure on replicating traditional gender and family norms.
However, it is important to keep in mind that behind the  official 
image is youth, whose perceptions of patriotism do not match 
the experiences of their parents’ generation. The generational 
gap between policymakers and youth is deepening (see Lassila, 
 Chapter 5, this volume). Youth can demonstrate the patriotism 
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in order to achieve some benefits in working life or enjoy the 
resources provided by the movement, especially in rural areas, 
where other hobby opportunities are scarce, but it is hard to say 
yet whether they will become the patriots desired by the Krem-
lin in this way. The project is not risk-free either. Military educa-
tion for young people may increase the amount of aggression and 
nationalist narratives in society, which may begin to work against 
the Kremlin. Also, if discourses of confrontation between liberals 
and patriots intensify and spread to schools, it will not stabilize 
future society.
Arguments over the legitimization of Ûnarmiâ and military-
patriotic education rely heavily on military traditionalism and 
enemy images. Education is seen as an integral part of a historical 
continuum; in other words, it is normalized at the level of rhetoric. 
The Pioneer and Komsomol organizations’ spirit is strongly pre-
sent in the goals of harnessing the whole generation under uni-
form patriotic education. Still, this study strengthens the idea that 
Ûnarmiâ’s purpose is to raise patriotic citizens who support the 
prevailing regime, rather than raise only conscripts. The  Russian 
Orthodox Church sees that national security is based on family 
and therefore the church plays an important role in the current 
formation of ideology and gender roles to create moral and tradi-
tional nuclear families. The Kremlin hopes that this patriotic force 
may in the future be used to curb and silence colour revolutions 
and the rise of opposition and prevent their subsequent emer-
gence as young people at risk of radicalization and oppositional 
thoughts are recruited at an early age in the movement. This claim 
of Ûnarmiâ as a tool of domestic policy is supported by the large 
involvement of girls, who are not subject to general conscrip-
tion, the movement’s systematic infiltration into the school world 
and the growing rhetoric of liberals as ‘others’.
Notes
 1 Vserossijskoe voenno-patriotičeskoe obŝestvennoe dviženie 
’Ûnarmiâ’. Research material can also be found under the names 
Yunarmiya, Yunarmia and Yunarmy.
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 2 Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and 
Navy. See Svynarenko’s Chapter 8 in this volume about the definition 
and purpose of DOSAAF.
 3 The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, commonly known as 
Cheka, was the first in a succession of Soviet secret police organiza-
tions.
 4 The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was the interior min-
istry of the Soviet Union 1934–1946, which included both ordinary 
public order activities and secret police activities.
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